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Casenotes
REMEMBER THE TITAN: MATTHEWS V. NFL LEAVES THE
PLAYING FIELD WIDE OPEN FOR FUTURE
COMPENSATION CLAIMANTS
“The NFL is a powerful narcotic – a great, exciting lifestyle.  Yet,
like everything the world offers, it’s temporary.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Ancient Greek myths described the Titans as a primeval race of
powerful gods.2  These mighty beings were known for their immor-
tality, stamina, and strength.3  Despite such seemingly insurmounta-
1. See Interview by Tom Rogeberg, Fellowship of Christian Athlete’s Senior VP
of Mktg. and Commc’ns, with Bruce Matthews, Hall of Fame Inductee, Fellowship
of Christian Athletes, in Kansas City, Mo. (May 20, 2007), available at http://
archives.fca.org/vsItemDisplay.lsp&objectID=4B17DA71-BAB7-4171-A07CB630F3
E69CD2&method=display (suggesting temporal restrictions on player utility are
relevant).
2. See The Titans, SDSU.EDU, http://edweb.sdsu.edu/people/bdodge/scaf-
fold/gg/titan.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2012) (listing and describing various Ti-
tans).  For a more comprehensive discussion on the origins and development of
the Titans myth, see WALTER BURKERT, THE ORIENTALIZING REVOLUTION: NEAR
EASTERN INFLUENCE ON GREEK CULTURE IN THE EARLY ARCHAIC AGE 94-95 (Harv.
Univ. Press, 1995).  The myth of the Titans has captured the attention of various
cultures for centuries. Id. The positive genetic traits of the Titans, including
speed, stamina, and endurance, mirror those embraced by our culture today. Id.
For a list of Titan references in popular culture, see Titans in Popular Culture,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Titans_in_popular_culture (last visited
Dec. 14, 2013) (providing examples of sports team names such as Gold Coast Ti-
tans, Newport Titans, Titans Cricket Team, New York Titans, Ulster Titans, Victoria
Titans, and, of course, Tennessee Titans).  Just as the Greeks worshipped their
Titans, society today “worships” their version of Titan – the professional athlete.
Id. Serving as an exemplar for the best mortal traits, Titans are well suited to mar-
ket-oriented popular culture. Id.
3. See William Smith, Atlas, DICTIONARY OF GREEK AND ROMAN BIOGRAPHY AND
MYTHOLOGY at A.53.atlas-bio-1 (London, 1848), available at http://www.perseus.
tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0104%3Aalphabetic+let-
ter%3DA%3Aentry+group%3D53%3Aentry%3Datlas-bio-1 (providing information
on Atlas, Titan who exemplifies all three traits).  Atlas is often portrayed holding
the weight of the world on his shoulders. See Image of Bronze Statue: Atlas, Lee
Lawrie, GOOGLE IMAGES, http://www.google.com/imghp (search “image of Bronze
Statue: Atlas, Lee Lawrie”).  These images communicate the duality of the Titan
race: they are physically invincible, yet they struggle under enormous amounts of
pressure and responsibility. See Brunilde S. Ridgway, Archaic Architectural Sculpture
and Travel Myths, 17-2 DIALOUGES D’HISTOIRE ANCIENNE 95, 108-110 (1991), availa-
ble at http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/dha_0755-7256_
(91)
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ble traits, the Titans were eventually conquered and overthrown by
a younger generation of deities, the Olympians.4  Though focused
on immortal beings, these ancient tales demonstrate a truism of
mortality: no amount of strength or stamina can triumph over the
natural processes of time.5
Bruce Matthews is a modern-day Titan, both in terms of his
ability and franchise association.6  The ex-Tennessee Titan played
football in the National Football League (“NFL”) for nineteen
years.7  Described by members of the profession as “extremely dura-
ble” and “incredibly valuable,” Matthews played more games and
seasons than any other offensive linemen in the NFL to date.8  Per-
haps even more astonishing, the player never missed a game due to
injury, starting in 229 consecutive games between 1987 and 2002.9
1991_num_17_2_1938?_Prescripts_Search_tabs1=standard& (describing typical
portrayal of Atlas as selfless hero).  This image seems particularly in sync with pop-
culture descriptions of Bruce Matthews. Compare Bruce Matthews Bibliography, infra
note 7 (portraying Matthews as “extremely durable”), with Atlas (Mythology), NEW R
WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Atlas_(my-
thology) (last visited December 19, 2013) (noting Grecians referred to Atlas as
“Atlas Telamon,” meaning “enduring Atlas”).
4. See generally The Olympians, GREEKMYTHOLOGY.COM, http://www.greekmy-
thology.com/Olympians/olympians.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2013) (explaining
role of Olympians in overthrowing Titans).
5. See Smith, supra note 3 (explaining how this juxtaposition of hardship and R
strength is portrayed in art).
6. See Mike Munchak, Fellow Tennessee Titan and Hall of Famer, Bruce Mat-
thews’ Enshrinement Speech Transcript, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME (Aug. 4, 2007),
available at http://www.profootballhof.com/story/2007/8/4/2511/ (providing
Mike Muchak’s statements at Bruce Matthews’ Pro Football Hall of Fame induc-
tion ceremony: “I don’t know if there’s ever been another player like Bruce Mat-
thews in the NFL, and I don’t know if there will ever be another one again.”); see
also Bruce Matthews Biography, NFL HALL OF FAME, http://www.profootballhof.com/
hof/member.aspx?player_id=264 (last visited Dec. 14, 2013) (listing accomplish-
ments and identifying Bruce Matthews as Hall of Fame football player who played
for Tennessee Titans).
7. See Bruce Matthews Bibliography, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME, http://www.
profootballhof.com/hof/member.aspx?player_id=264 (last visited Dec. 14, 2013)
(listing Bruce Matthews’ accomplishments and stating that Matthews played for
Tennessee Titans).
8. See id. (highlighting that at time of his retirement, Matthews had played
more games than any other NFL player).  Matthews’ record has since been sur-
passed by Jerry Rice and Brett Favre, but Matthews still holds several Oilers/Titans
records: most seasons played (19), most games played in career (296), most con-
secutive games played (232), and most consecutive games started (229). Id.
9. See id. (revealing Matthews’ impressive record for consecutive games for
which he was starter). Although Matthews was never benched for injury, the con-
stant play was likely to lead to cumulative injury. See 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers’ Com-
pensation § 314 (discussing cumulative trauma within context of workers’
compensation).  Although some jurisdictions do not allow recovery for gradually
occurring injuries, others have adopted a “cumulative injury rule.” Id.  Under this
rule, an employee can receive workers’ compensation for disabilities that develop
2
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Yet with time, like the Titans of myth, this man’s awe-inspiring
strength, stamina, and durability faded.10
Matthews retired from professional football in 2001, but his
mythic story was yet to be complete.11  In 2009, the ex-Titan cap-
tured public attention for tackling a different type of adversary.12
The challenge was a matter to be tried in a court of law, rather than
in a stadium or on a field, and it would be fought against one of the
strongest, well-financed entities in the United States: the NFL.13
The dispute arose in 2008, when Matthews filed an application
seeking workers’ compensation benefits from California.14  In re-
sponse to his application, the Tennessee Titans and the National
Football League Management Council (“NFLMC”) filed a non-in-
jury grievance contending that Matthews breached his employment
contract by filing a claim.15  The NFLMC supported this argument
by noting a specific clause in Matthews’ employment provision that
expressly provided that all workers’ compensation claims would be
gradually. Id. This theory is also known as the “rapid repetitive motion theory.”
Id.
10. See John McClain, Longtime Oilers/Titans Lineman Reluctantly Calls It a Ca-
reer, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, July 13, 2002, available at http://www.chron.com/
sports/texans/article/Ex-Oiler-Matthews-reluctantly-calls-it-a-career-2091171.php
(announcing retirement of Bruce Matthews).  “When asked how he would like to
be remembered as a player, Matthews hesitated, sighed and said: ‘He played hard,
and he played fair.’” Id.
11. See generally, Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n v. Nat’l Football League
Mgmt. Council, No. 10CV1671, 2011 WL 31068 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2011) [hereinaf-
ter Matthews I], aff’d sub nom Matthews v. Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council, 688
F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Matthews II] (supporting proposition that
Matthews has maintained public profile and hinting that Matthews’ legal legacy
will add to his already impressive sports legacy).
12. See id. (explaining that Matthews’ filed his workers’ compensation applica-
tion in 2008).
13. See, e.g., Jami A. Maul, Comment, America’s Favorite “Nonprofits”: Taxation of
the National Football League and Sports Organizations, 80 UMKC L. REV. 199, 199
(2011) (noting that “professional sports in America are an approximately $225
billion industry”).  “Imagine a business that has $7.8 billion in revenue in the cur-
rent year, with an overall operating income of more than $1.0 billion.  The busi-
ness comprises thirty-two individual franchises that themselves each have an
average value of $1.0 billion.  Now imagine this organization is classified by the
Internal Revenue Service as a nonprofit organization under Internal Revenue
Code § 501(c)(6), and thus, while the individual franchises may have to pay taxes,
the organization itself enjoys tax-exempt status. . . . This organization is not a relig-
ious organization or denomination, though many may follow it religiously.  This
‘nonprofit’ organization is the National Football League.” Id.  Recall that the Ti-
tans were gods; the Greeks worshiped the Titans according to their polytheistic
religious rituals. See Smith, supra note 3.  Ironically, this American legal ritual R
treats the NFL like a religious organization.  See Maul, supra note 13, at 199. R
14. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1110 (providing procedural history).
15. See id. (noting that filing of application was arguably breach of Matthews’
employment contract).
3
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decided under Tennessee law.16  As mandated by the NFL Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”), the controversy was submitted
to binding arbitration.17
The arbitrator determined that the choice of law clause in Mat-
thews’ employment contract was valid.18  Siding with the NFL, the
arbitrator explained that the filing of a workers’ compensation ap-
plication constituted a breach by Matthews of his employment con-
tract.19  Matthews was ordered to “cease and desist” from seeking
California benefits.20  In accord with Matthews’ “extremely durable”
nature, the retired Titan filed suit in the Federal District in Califor-
nia, seeking to vacate the arbitrator’s decision.21  The Federal Dis-
trict Court denied Matthews’ motion to vacate and granted the
Titans and NFLMC’s cross-motion to confirm the award in January
of 2011.22  Highlighting his offensive orientation both on and off
the field, Matthews appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.23  The stage was set for the clash of the titans.24
On August 6, 2012, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued
its decision in Matthews v. National Football League, denying the for-
mer player’s claim for workers’ compensation in California.25  In
examining Matthews’ claim, the court determined that the state
policy protecting employees from inadvertently waiving their access
to state workers’ compensation regimes could not be appropriately
applied to Matthews.26  The applicability of state policy to Mat-
thews’ claim stemmed from the fact that Matthews could not
demonstrate that he would be found eligible to receive workers’
compensation benefits from California, if given the chance to ap-
16. See id. (referring claimant to choice of law provision in employment
contract).
17. See NFL Mgmt. Council/Tenn. Titans v. NFL Players Ass’n/Bruce Mat-
thews (Aug. 5, 2010) (Sharpe, Arb.), available at http://www.americanbar.org/con-
tent/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/entertainment_sports/matthews_v_
tennessee_titans.authcheckdam.PDF [hereinafter Matthews Arbitration] (deciding
arbitration in favor of NFL).
18. See id. (upholding choice of law provision).
19. See id. (agreeing with NFL that filing of claim constituted breach).
20. Id. (mandating cease and desist).
21. See generally Matthews I, No. 10CV1671, 2011 WL 31068 at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan.
5, 2011) (seeking to vacate arbitrator’s award and get approval to apply for work-
ers’ compensation in California).
22. See id. at *8 (confirming arbitration award).
23. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing procedural
history).
24. CLASH OF THE TITANS (Warner Bros. 2010) (emphasizing prevalence of
Titan references in popular culture).
25. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1116-17 (affirming lower court’s decision).
26. See id. at 1113 (finding that state policy does not apply to Matthews).
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ply.27  The court explained that it could not use the state public
policy against inadvertent waivers to protect a right that might not
even exist for Matthews.28
Matthews demonstrates the considerable barriers to profes-
sional athlete-claimants in workers’ compensation: courts require
assurance that players would be eligible for a particular state’s work-
ers’ compensation benefits, if granted access to apply; however, re-
strictive state laws and obstructive provisions in employment
contracts ensure that a player will be enjoined from applying before
the appropriate state agency can assess their application.29  Al-
though these limitations appear insurmountable, this Casenote will
highlight how the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Matthews provides gui-
dance and hope for future NFL claimants.30
II. FACTS
Bruce Matthews was born to play football.31  One need not
look further than his lineage to validate this statement; the Mat-
thews family is an NFL dynasty.32  Bruce Matthews’ father, Clay Mat-
thews, Sr., played for the San Francisco 49ers in the 1950s.33  Clay
Matthews, Jr., Bruce Matthews’ brother, played in the NFL for
nineteen years, mostly for the Cleveland Browns.34  Matthews’
nephews currently play for the Green Bay Packers and the Philadel-
phia Eagles.35  In Greek Mythology, the Titans derived from the
27. See id. (prohibiting Matthews’ filing of application because ultimate eligi-
bility under California workers’ compensation regime is unclear).
28. See id. (using hypothetical failure of Matthews’ claim to ban him from
applying).
29. For a discussion of the court’s findings in Matthews, see infra notes 141-191 R
and accompanying text.
30. For a discussion hypothesizing the impact of the court’s findings in Mat-
thews on future cases, see infra notes 222-236 and accompanying text. R
31. See Len Pasquarelli, Matthews Part of Amazing Football Family, ESPN.COM
(July 16, 2002), available at http://a.espncdn.com/nfl/columns/pasquarelli_len/
1406296.html (quoting Titans coach, Jeff Fisher, “Whatever they’ve got, the family
ought to bottle it and sell it, because they’d make a fortune.”).
32. For a further discussion of Bruce Matthews’ family football bloodlines, see
infra note 39 and accompanying text. R
33. For a further discussion of Bruce Matthews’ father and his NFL career, see
infra note 39 and accompanying text. R
34. For a further discussion of the career longevity of both Clay Matthews, Jr.
and Bruce Matthews, see infra note 39 and accompanying text. R
35. For a further discussion substantiating the claim that NFL involvement is
genetic for Matthews, see infra note 39 and accompanying text. R
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most divine royal bloodlines.36  To be a Titan in professional foot-
ball, a place in the Matthews family represents a royal flush.37
Bruce Matthews lived up to the high standard set by his family
name.38  After his first year of high school, Matthews moved with his
family from Chicago to Los Angeles.39  College scouts recognized
Matthews’ potential from the outset, as he proved to be a standout
on both the offensive and defensive lines.40  Matthews attended the
University of Southern California where he earned an All-American
title and won the Morris Trophy.41  He was a first-round draft
choice for Tennessee, where he stayed for nineteen years, playing
first with the Houston Oilers and later for the team’s successors, the
Tennessee Oilers and the Tennessee Titans (“Titans”).42
36. See The Titans, supra note 2 (introducing concept of Titans). R
37. See Pasquarelli, supra note 31 (supporting claim that Bruce Matthews is R
genetically inclined to play football).
38. See Bruce Matthews Biography, supra note 6 (describing Matthews’ excep- R
tional career); see also Pasquarelli, supra note 31 (discussing Bruce Matthews’ foot- R
ball family).
39. See Gene Sapakoff, Charleston’s First Family of Football, THE POST AND COU-
RIER (Jan. 21, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.postandcourier.com/article/201101
21/PC1602/301219931 (describing Bruce Matthews’ family tree and successful
football careers of Bruce’s family).  “ ‘[T]here is so much going on with so many
Matthews playing football, it can get a little overwhelming at times,’ said Carolyn
Matthews, Clay [Matthews] Sr.’s wife of 29 years.” Id.
40. See Bruce Matthews (American Football), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Bruce_Matthews_(American_football) (last visited Dec. 14, 2013) (chroni-
cling Bruce Matthews’ football experiences).  “[Bruce Matthews] was a standout
playing on both the offensive and defensive line at Arcadia High School.  He was
also an all-league wrestler.” Id.
41. See Bruce Matthews, THE MORRIS TROPHY,  http://www.morristrophy.com/
past-winners/players/bruce-matthews/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2013) (noting that
Bruce Matthews “[w]on the Pac-10 Morris Trophy (offense) in 1982[;] [w]as a
[two]-time All-Conference first teamer (1981-82)[;] [p]layed in the 1983 Hula
Bowl[;] [w]as a 1982 Playboy Pre-Season All-American . . . .”); see also THE MORRIS
TROPHY, http://www.morristrophy.com/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2013) (“The Morris
Trophy is the college football award given annually to the top offensive lineman
and defensive lineman in the Pacific-12 Conference.  Founded by Traci Morris, it
has been awarded since 1980.  Traci’s idea was to have players vote for the best
opponent they faced on the field. As such it is one of the best awards a player can
receive.  It truly comes from his peers.”).
42. See Bruce Matthews Biography, supra note 6 (detailing highlights of Bruce R
Matthews’ career).  The Oilers changed their name to coincide with the opening
of their new stadium in 1999. See History: 1990s, THE OFFICIAL SITE OF THE TENNES-
SEE TITANS, http://www.titansonline.com/team/history/history-1990s.html (last
visited on Dec. 14, 2013) (providing that on November 14, 1998, Oilers owner K.S.
‘Bud’ Adams, Jr., [announced] that the Oilers will become the ‘Tennessee Titans’
beginning in 1999.  ‘We wanted a new nickname to reflect strength, leadership
and other heroic qualities,’ Adams said.”).  On December 22, 1998, “Oilers owner
K.S. ‘Bud’ Adams, Jr., [unveiled] new Tennessee Titans logo and colors, featuring
the fire of the Titans and exemplifying power, strength, knowledge and excel-
lence.  ‘I feel we have developed a logo that fans throughout the state of Tennes-
see and around the country will embrace for years to come,’ Adams said.” Id.
6
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Matthews’ professional career spanned from 1983 to 2002.43
Six years after he retired, Matthews filed for workers’ compensation
benefits in California.44  He claimed to have pain and disability re-
sulting from injuries sustained while employed by the NFL at vari-
ous locations over his professional career.45  Among other injuries,
Matthews noted pain in his neck, his back, and in his upper and
lower extremities.46  Though Matthews filed suit in California, he
did not allege that he sustained any particular injury in that state.47
Rather, the player proposed that based on the frequency with
which he played against California teams, some of the blows, which
43. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (introducing fact that
Matthews played professional football in NFL for nineteen years).  This is much
longer than the average player-span, which is approximately six years. See What Is
Average NFL Player’s Career Length? Longer Than You Might Think, Commissioner Good-
ell Says, NFL COMMUNICATIONS (Apr. 18, 2011), available at http://nflcommunica-
tions.com/2011/04/18/what-is-average-nfl-player%E2%80%99s-career-length-
longer-than-you-might-think-commissioner-goodell-says/ (“‘Frequently, it is said
that the average career is about 3.5 years.  In fact, if a player makes an opening day
roster, his career is very close to six years,’ Commissioner Goodell said.  ‘If you are
a first-round draft choice, the average career is close to nine years.  That 3.5-year
average is really a misrepresentation.  What it adds is a lot of players who don’t
make an NFL roster and it brings down the average.’”).
44. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1110 (stating that Matthews retired in 2002 and
filed for workers’ compensation benefits in California in 2008).
45. See Appellant’s Opening Brief at *7, Matthews v. NFL Mgmt. Council, 688
F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-55186), 2011 WL 2180498 (claiming injuries
resulted from his working for Titans as NFL player); see also David S. Cerra, Com-
ment, Unringing the Bell: Former Players Sue NFL and Helmet Manufacturers over Concus-
sion Risks in Maxwell v. NFL, 16 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 265, 278 (2012) (asserting
that, “[b]ased on the NFL’s matchup scheme, most players have likely played a
game in California.”); see also 2013 Opponents Determined, NFL COMMUNICATIONS,
http://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2012/12/2013-opponents-determined.pdf
(last visited Dec. 14, 2013) (describing current NFL scheduling formula whereby
each team will both host and visit every other team at least once every eight years).
Prior to 2002, the NFL used similar scheduling formulas and “teams always played
four of the teams from a division in the other conference on a rotating basis (albeit
with the standings playing a role in who would play who), but not their own; mean-
ing that while an AFC team would be more likely to play each NFC team on a
regular basis, they could go far longer without playing every team in their own
conference.  For example, between 1970 (when the leagues merged) and 2002
(when the current schedule was introduced) the Denver Broncos and the Miami
Dolphins played only 6 times; including a stretch (1976–1997) where they met
only once in 22 seasons.” National Football League Regular Season, WIKIPEDIA, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Football_League_regular_season (last visited
Dec. 14, 2013) (providing description of NFL scheduling formula for NFL seasons
prior to 2002).
46. See Complaint and Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award at 14-17, NFL
Players Ass’n v. NFL Mgmt. Council, No. 10CV1671 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2011), 2010
WL 3296826 (offering NFL’s contacts with California).  Three of the thirty-two
franchises in the NFL are headquartered in California: the San Diego Chargers;
the San Francisco 49ers; and the Oakland Raiders. Id.
47. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1110 (noting that Bruce Matthews did not
sustain any particular injury in California).
7
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in accumulation, led to his injuries, must have been received in Cal-
ifornia stadiums.48
In cooperation with the NFLMC, the Titans filed a grievance
against Matthews.49  The employment agreement the Titans had
with Matthews contained a specific clause dictating that Tennessee
would be the forum for any workers’ compensation claims brought
by players.50  Thus, the Titans argued that Matthews’ application for
workers’ compensation benefits in California constituted a breach
of their employment agreement.51  The grievance sought to pre-
vent Matthews from pursuing his workers’ compensation claim in
California.52  Unable to reach a settlement, the parties arbitrated
their dispute pursuant to a binding arbitration clause in Matthews’
NFL collective bargaining agreement.53
The arbitrator determined that Matthews had violated the
terms of his contract by pursuing workers’ compensation under
California law.54  Specifically, the arbitrator found that the choice
of law provision in the employment agreement constituted a prom-
ise to apply Tennessee law to any workers’ compensation claim Mat-
thews might bring.55  As a result of the arbitration, Matthews was
48. See id. at 1114 (summarizing Matthews’ claim and explaining why it fails).
“In briefing, Matthews argues – without citation to the record – that he was injured
in California, apparently on the theory that all the games he played during his
career contributed to the ailments he suffers today.  Matthews may be correct, as a
matter of fact, that every game (or at least most games) contributed to his cumula-
tive injuries, but it is not clear that, as a matter of California law, this means he falls
within the category of employees to whom California extends workers’ compensa-
tion coverage.” Id.
49. See id. at 1111 (providing procedural history).
50. See id. at 1110 n.1 (providing language from Matthews’ contract stating,
“Jurisdiction of all workers compensation claims and all other matters related to
workers compensation . . . including all issues of law, issues of fact, and matters
related to workers compensation benefits, shall be exclusively determined by and
exclusively decided in accordance with the internal laws of the State of Tennessee
without resort to choice of law rules.”).
51. See id. at 1110 (characterizing Matthews’ actions as breach of employment
contract).
52. See id. (offering information regarding function and purpose of NFL’s
grievance).
53. See id. (affirming that grievance would remedy any hypothetical breach
because it would prohibit Matthews’ from applying and act of applying is breach);
see also Matthews Arbitration, (Aug. 5, 2010) (Sharpe, Arb.), available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/entertainment_
sports/matthews_v_tennessee_titans.authcheckdam.PDF (providing arbitration
decision).
54. See Matthews I, No. 10CV1671, 2011 WL 31068, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5,
2011)  (detailing findings of arbitrator’s decision); see also Matthews Arbitration,
(Aug. 5, 2010) (Sharpe, Arb.) (providing arbitration decision).
55. See Matthews Arbitration, (Aug. 5, 2010) (Sharpe, Arb.) (deciding arbitra-
tion in favor of NFL).  “[Matthews] is not precluded under Paragraph 26D from
8
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ordered to “cease and desist” from seeking benefits under Califor-
nia law.56  Consequently, he filed suit in federal district court to
vacate the arbitration award.57  In January of 2011, Matthews’ mo-
tion to vacate the arbitration award was denied by the district
court.58  Matthews’ subsequent appeal was granted by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.59
The court held that Matthews’ workers’ compensation claim
did not fall within California’s workers’ compensation regime.60  In
doing so, the court upheld the arbitration award, finding that it did
not violate any well-defined or dominant public policy of California
law.61  The court supported its position by stating that Matthews
had made no showing that he suffered any discrete injury or need
for medical service in California.62  He had instead relied on al-
leged cumulative injuries incurred at various locations throughout
his playing career.63
III. BACKGROUND
The Matthews litigation arrived at the Ninth Circuit just as the
professional sports community was beginning to understand the
ramifications of cumulative injuries.64  The simultaneous nature of
Matthews’ claim and national acknowledgement of cumulative in-
jury as a threat created a unique context within which the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals promulgated its decision.65  In addition to
this complex legal and cultural environment, competing federal
and state labor law policies on alternative dispute resolution render
filing his workers compensation claim in California.  However, the Player is re-
quired to proceed under Tennessee law, and accordingly shall cease and desist
from attempting to persuade the California tribunals to apply California law in
violation of Paragraph 26D of [Matthew’s] contract.” Id. at 18.
56. Id. (ordering Matthews to cease and desist from applying for workers’
compensation benefits in California).
57. See Matthews I, 2011 WL 31068, at *8 (chronicling history of litigation and
stating Matthews’ appealed arbitrator’s award).
58. See id. (affirming arbitrator’s award).
59. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2012) (providing procedural
history).
60. See id. at 1114 (affirming arbitrator’s award and district court’s decision).
61. See id. (elaborating on court’s holding).
62. See id. (emphasizing importance of listing specific injuries).
63. See id. (explaining pitfalls of Matthews’ application).
64. For a discussion on cumulative injury and, in particular, how cumulative
injuries from concussions are causing serious physical and mental health issues for
former professional athletes, see infra note 78 and accompanying text. R
65. For a discussion on how the legal and cultural settings render Matthews a
particularly unique case, see infra notes 141-163 and 222-236 and accompanying R
text.
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the opinion even more intricate.66  The distinct cultural climate
and dueling labor law policies make this case particularly compel-
ling.67  Although the case is novel in many ways, Matthews also serves
to illuminate and review basic concepts of alternative dispute reso-
lution, workers compensation, and jurisdiction.68  By placing these
traditional principles in an untraditional context, Matthews be-
comes a dynamic piece of precedent for a variety of future
litigants.69
A. Recognition of Cumulative Player Injury as a Stimulus
for Reform
Currently, the NFL is defending itself against more than four
thousand player-plaintiffs who allege that team healthcare profes-
sionals concealed from them the long-term risks associated with cu-
mulative injury during their careers.70  Dubbed the “Concussion
Conundrum” by sports law experts, this wave of highly publicized
litigation is likely to impact the ways in which the legal, healthcare,
and professional sports sectors interact.71  In this context, the issue
of whether retired professional athletes may benefit from state
workers’ compensation programs will become even more
pressing.72
Professional athletes have always been treated differently than
other types of employees under workers’ compensation laws.73  This
66. For a detailed analysis of competing federal and state policies, see infra
notes 164-170 and accompanying text. R
67. For a discussion on how the unique setting will impact the case’s utility for
future claimants, see infra notes 78 and accompanying text. R
68. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1109 (introducing variety of legal concepts that
Court must reconcile).
69. For a discussion on how the case may be used, both by courts and by those
in the sports community to reduce risk inherent in the game, see infra notes 78 R
and accompanying text.
70. See NFL CONCUSSION LITIGATION, http://nflconcussionlitigation.com (last
visited Dec. 14, 2013) (compiling data, reports, court materials, litigation updates,
and scholarly articles regarding NFL concussion litigation).
71. See Symposium, “Concussion Conundrum”: Panels 2 & 3, 20 MOORAD SPORTS
L.J. 347 (2013) (gathering professional athletes, legal scholars, and medical profes-
sionals to address issue of cumulative trauma and concussions in retired profes-
sional athletes).
72. See NFL CONCUSSION LITIGATION, supra note 70 (exploring complexities of R
this movement).
73. See Rachel Schaffer, Comment, Grabbing Them by the Balls: Legislatures,
Courts, and Team Owners Bar Non-Elite Professional Athletes from Workers’ Compensation,
8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 623, 635 (2000) (purporting that athletes have
been treated differently than other employees in workers’ compensation).  For a
response to many who might argue that the high salaries of professional athletes
alleviates the need for workers’ compensation, see ROBERT C. BERRY & GLENN M.
10
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disparity in treatment manifests itself differently from state to state;
but in every state it is more difficult for a professional athlete to
receive workers’ compensation when compared to most other types
of employees.74  Some states even deny eligibility to professional
athletes all together.75  In addition to the limits imposed by state
statutes, team owners often use employment contracts to limit the
collection of workers’ compensation benefits by professional ath-
letes.76  Players who need state health benefits for injuries stem-
ming from a career of tackles are thus faced with both state and
team-imposed barriers.77  As the NFL’s Concussion Conundrum
WONG, LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES 42 (1986) (comparing stable
life-long earnings to short period professional athletes earn high salaries); see also
Frederic Pepe & Thomas P. Frerichs, Injustice Uncovered? Worker’s Compensation and
the Professional Athlete, in SPORTS AND THE LAW 18, 19 (Charles E. Quirk ed., 1996)
(arguing professional athletes need comparable legal protection provided by work-
ers’ compensation because, despite common misperception, not all professional
athletes earn high salaries).
74. See Stephen Cormac Carlin & Christopher M. Fairman, Note, Squeeze Play;
Workers’ Compensation and the Professional Athlete, 12 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV.
95, 104 (1995) (noting that athletes’ workers’ compensation differs from that re-
ceived by other employees in two ways: athletes are typically limited by statute and
limited by employer contract).
75. See Schaffer, supra note 73, at 635 (recognizing variance between state R
workers’ compensation laws).  For a comprehensive discussion on workers’ com-
pensation and its interaction with professional athletes, see Darryll M. Halcomb
Lewis, An Analysis of Brown v. National Football League, 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
263, 269 (2002) (analyzing retired NFL player’s workers’ compensation claim).
Lewis notes that, “[h]istorically, workers’ compensation was the outgrowth of legis-
lative intervention in a litigious feud between labor and industry.” Id. at 270.  Arbi-
tration was also a product of such feuds. See Bobbi N. Roquemore, Comment,
Creating a Level Playing Field: The Case for Bringing Workers’ Compensation for Profes-
sional Athletes into a Single Federal System by Extending the Longshore Act, 57 LOY. L. REV.
793, 802 (2011) (discussing original goal of arbitration to extend affordable access
to justice is harming employees, particularly professional athletes).  Some com-
mentators would argue that legislative activism in these areas has created more
litigation problems, not less.  Id.
76. See Schaffer, supra note 73, at 636 (explaining that professional sports R
team owners specifically contemplate and limit workers’ compensation benefits for
professional athletes via employment contracts). See, e.g., Council of the District of
Columbia, Committee on Government Operations, D.C. Arena Professional Ath-
letic Teams Act of 1997, Bill No. 12-337, Legislation No. B12-0337 (introduced Jul.
14, 1997) (providing example of proposed bill to exclude professional athletes in
Washington D.C. from receiving workers’ compensation benefits).
77. See Schaffer, supra note 73, at 639 (explaining that “[s]tates generally ap- R
proach workers’ compensation benefits for professional athletes in the following
ways: statutory exclusion method; functional exclusion method; exclusion through
case-law method; [and the] election method.”).  The statutory exclusion method
explicitly carves professional athletes out of the state workers’ compensation
scheme. See id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02(1)(c)-(d) (West 2013)) (stating
“employment” does not include service performed by professional athlete).  The
functional exclusion method implicitly creates a barrier to recovery by altering the
way that the regular workers’ compensation laws function. See id. (citing IOWA
CODE ANN. § 85.33(6) (West 2013)) (creating additional criteria when determin-
11
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continues to shed light on the health risks associated with participa-
tion in professional sports, the issue of access to state workers’ com-
pensation will become even more critical.78  This tragic, staggering
wave of cumulative injury litigation will act as a catalyst, encourag-
ing reform against the stigma of the professional athlete in labor
and administrative law contexts.79
Due to its favorable employment laws, California is a haven for
injured employees.80  In fact, the state boasts one of the most com-
prehensive and employee-friendly compensation schemes in the
ing benefits for injured professional athletes).  Exclusion through case-law occurs
when the courts create precedent that functions as a denial of benefits.  See id.
(citing Palmer v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 621 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981)) (holding that compensation statute, which protects against injuries result-
ing from accidents, does not apply to football player’s injury resulting from delib-
erate collision of bodies during course of professional football game).  The
election method allows employers to opt out of participation in the state compen-
sation system. See id. (citing 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/11 (West 2012) (limit-
ing scope of Act to employers specifically enumerated in Act or employers opting
to provide and pay compensation as defined by Act).
78. See Darren Heitner, The NFL and the Booming Business of Concussions,
FORBES (Mar. 6, 2013, 8:03 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/
2013/03/06/the-booming-business-of-concussions/ (discussing 100-plus pending
lawsuits against NFL seeking to recover for cumulative injury); see also Gary White,
Injuries to Ex-NFL Players’ Brains Raise Concern, FLA. LEDGER (Aug. 29, 2010, 8:18
PM), http://www.theledger.com/article/20100829/NEWS/8295036/1338 (not-
ing tackles in NFL can sustain impacts in excess of 100 G-force); Michelle L.
Modery, Comment, Injury Time-Out: Justifying Workers’ Compensation Awards to Retired
Athletes with Concussion-Caused Dementia, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 247, 282 (2011) (“[A]
professional athlete who suffers head injuries during employment can, and should,
be entitled to workers’ compensation.”); Daniel J. Kain, Note, “It’s Just a Concus-
sion:” The National Football League’s Denial of a Causal Link Between Multiple Concus-
sions and Later-Life Cognitive Decline, 40 RUTGERS  L.J. 697, 725 n.164 (2009)
(providing details of articles published by NFL “denying scientific results adverse
to its position”); Jesse Hicks, Can Technology Solve the NFL’s Head Injury Problem?,
THE VERGE  (Feb. 4, 2013, 4:51 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/2/4/
3951510/can-technology-solve-the-nfls-head-injury-problem (evidencing highly
publicized nature of concussion controversy); Paul Barrett, Will Brain Injury Law-
suits Doom or Save the NFL?, BUS. WK., Feb. 4, 2013, at 62, available at http://www.
businessweek.com/articles/2013-01-31/will-brain-injury-lawsuits-doom-or-save-the-
nfl (providing history and analysis of NFL concussion litigation).
79. See generally NFL CONCUSSION LITIGATION, supra note 70 (emphasizing im- R
portance of comprehensive injury litigation to sports law field).
80. See John Culhane, The NFL’s Next Big Headache, SLATE (Feb. 2, 2011),
http://www.slate.com/id/2283618/ (noting that California is “haven for ex-foot-
ball players”); see also Cerra, supra note 45 (describing plaintiff-friendly statute of R
limitations regime in California and numerous exceptions to statutory norm in
worker’s compensation that also make California attractive forum for workers’
compensation claims); see, e.g., 50-State Survey on Workers’ Comp Rates Released,
HR.BLR.COM (Oct. 11, 2012), http://hr.blr.com/HR-news/HR-Administration/
Workers-Workmen-Compensation/50-state-study-on-workers-comp-rates-released
(ranking California as state with third highest compensation premium rates in
United States of America).
12
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol21/iss1/5
34639-vls_21-1 Sheet No. 60 Side A      03/14/2014   13:49:04
34639-vls_21-1 Sheet No. 60 Side A      03/14/2014   13:49:04
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\21-1\VLS105.txt unknown Seq: 13 11-MAR-14 10:44
2014] MATTHEWS V. NFL 103
country.81  In addition to its employee-friendly workers’ compensa-
tion system, California also attracts NFL claimants because the state
affords sufficient contacts to establish jurisdiction.82  With three
NFL teams housed within its borders, California is the state where
NFL teams play most frequently.83  As awareness of the long-term
health risks of athletic cumulative injuries grows, California appears
to be an enticing solution for retired athletes seeking remedy for
injuries sustained during their professional careers.84  Many retired
NFL athletes have already taken note.85  In 2010, the New York Times
was first to report the staggering 700-plus cumulative injury cases
pending in California; that number continues to grow.86  At first
glance, Matthews’ case casts doubt on the viability of such workers’
compensation claims.87  Upon closer examination, the case actually
81. See Culhane, supra note 80 (listing reasons why California is popular state
in which to file workers’ compensation applications); see also Alan Schwarz, Case
Will Test Teams’ Liability in Dementia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/sports/football/06worker.html?page-
wanted=all&_r=0 (finding two reasons for California’s attraction: ease in establish-
ing sufficient contacts and easily circumvented statutes of limitations).  Explaining
that “[m]ost states require workers’ compensation claims to be filed within one to
five years of the injury; California’s statute of limitations does not begin until the
employer formally advises the injured worker of his or her right to workers’ com-
pensation.  N.F.L. teams have almost never brought up workers’ compensation –
hoping to avoid even more claims, several lawyers said – so long-retired players can
file for injuries sustained decades ago.  Dozens of veterans from as far back as the
1960s and ‘70s, including the star San Diego Chargers wide receiver Lance Al-
worth, who retired in 1972 and turns 70 in August, have California cases pending.”
Id.  (explaining why California’s workers’ compensation system is favorable to NFL
former player litigation).
82. See Darren Rovell, Teams Face Workers’ Comp. Threat, ESPN.COM (Aug. 30,
2012), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/8316657/nfl-teams-facing-large-
bills-related-workers-compensation-claims-head-injuries (“The most exposure to
teams lies in the state where the most teams play: California.”).
83. See id. (“A player who played just one game or had one practice in [Cali-
fornia] – even as a member of another team – is eligible to file a claim.”).
84. See Heitner, supra note 78 (demonstrating that many of these claims at- R
tempt to recover for long-term mental and physical health consequences of multi-
ple concussions).
85. See Schwarz, supra note 81 (reporting hundreds of retired athletes flock- R
ing to California).
86. See id. (explaining that most of these cumulative injury cases involve or-
thopedic injuries and aim to receive settlements ranging from $100,000 to
$200,000 but stating that concussion cases are on rise and cost, on average, more
than $1 million).
87. See NFL Owners Win Important Victory Against NFL PA Over Choice of Law
Provision in Standard NFL Contract, PETERSON, COLANTONI, COLLINS & DAVIS, LLP
(Aug. 26 2010), http://pcllp.net/archives/582 (describing Matthews as victory for
NFL).
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provides useful guidance for future player-litigants seeking to re-
cover in California.88
In addition to state statutory barriers, team owners also use em-
ployment contracts to deny players future access to state workers’
compensation.89  Binding arbitration clauses and choice of law pro-
visions in these contracts are common mechanisms used by teams
to prevent player claims from reaching the state workers’ compen-
sation office.90  By signing an employment contract, a player sub-
scribes to a choice of law provision, which, in most team contracts,
states that the player of the team for a certain state may only ever
apply for workers’ compensation in that particular state.91  Binding
arbitration clauses work in tandem with these choice-of-law provi-
sions to limit a player’s ability to access out-of state workers’ com-
pensation programs.92  In most circumstances when a player
attempts to apply for workers’ compensation in a state other than
the state his or her contract mandates, the team will file an injunc-
tion with the state court.93  The binding arbitration clause in the
athlete’s employment contract then forces the players to submit the
dispute to arbitration.94  Arbitrators, who are essentially bound by
precedent, will uphold and enforce the choice of law provision in
the employment contract.95  Consequently, these two contractual
devices make it virtually impossible for players to file an application
for workers’ compensation in any state other than the state their
contracts stipulate.96  By signing their team’s employment contract
without fully understanding these risks, players may inadvertently
88. For a discussion on how the Matthews functions as positive precedent for
player claimants, see infra notes 192-236 and accompanying text. R
89. See Schaffer, supra note 73, at 635-50 (discussing ways that employers and R
states have disenfranchised players seeking workers’ compensation).
90. See Stephen Cormac Carlin & Christopher M. Fairman, supra note 74, at R
104-17 (describing how employers and states have used contractual and statutory
mechanisms for restricting player access to workers’ compensation).
91. See Schaffer supra note 73, at 635-36 (detailing contractual mechanism R
through which players are denied access to workers’ compensation).
92. See Stephen Cormac Carlin & Christopher M. Fairman, supra note 74, at R
112-14 (emphasizing restrictive power of choice of law provision and binding arbi-
tration clause).
93. See Schaffer, supra note 73, at 635 (detailing procedural impact of player’s R
application for workers’ compensation).
94. See id. (noting binding arbitration clause functions as second barrier to
access).
95. See, e.g., Matthews II, 688 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2012) (providing example of
arbitrator siding with NFL); see also Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Abdullah, No. 1:09-
cv-738, 2013 WL 154077 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 15, 2013) (siding with NFL by upholding
employment contract in favor of NFL).
96. For detailed discussion of difficulties faced by professional athletes in fil-
ing workers’ compensation claims and why theories supporting restrictive con-
14
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waive their right to apply for workers’ compensation in most states
and may alter the already meager state workers’ compensation pro-
tections offered to professional athletes in the state their contract
sets forth.97
Although federal labor law policy tends to favor alternative
means of remedying disputes, an exception exists when alternative
means of dispute resolution contravene public policy.98  Some
states, including California, have been progressive in protecting in-
dividuals from inadvertently waiving their rights to workers’ com-
pensation benefits through contractual provisions.99  As awareness
of the long-term health effects of playing contact sports at a profes-
sional level increases, the federal policy which favors alternative dis-
pute resolution will clash with state and public policies that are
aimed at protecting individual employees.100  Ultimately, judicial
decisions in this area will require a highly factual analysis that turns
on whether the individual seeking workers’ compensation ade-
quately meets each state’s unique workers’ compensation re-
gime.101 Matthews v. National Football League provides an example of
such an analysis.102
tracts may be based on misconceptions, see supra notes 73-74 and accompanying R
text.
97. See Stephen Cormac Carlin & Christopher M. Fairman, supra note 74, at R
104-17 (highlighting dual limitations: state and employer; statutes and contracts).
98. See United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, Local 588 v. Foster
Poultry Farms, 74 F.3d 169, 173 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[B]ecause federal labor policy
strongly favors the resolution of labor disputes through arbitration, [j]udicial scru-
tiny of an arbitrator’s decision is extremely limited.”).
99. See, e.g., Stead Motors v. Auto. Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200,
1209 (9th Cir. 1989) (considering “the nature and extent of the ‘public policy
exception’ to the finality of labor arbitrators’ awards”); see also CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 5000 (West 2013) (“No contract, rule, or regulation shall exempt the employer
from liability for the compensation fixed by [the workers’ compensation stat-
ute].”); CAL. LAB. CODE § 2804 (West 2013) (“Any contract or agreement, express
or implied, made by any employee to waive the benefits of this article or any part
thereof, is null and void . . . .”).
100. See Rovell, supra note 82 (illuminating growing attitude in sports law R
community).  As one commentator stated, “The NFL has been making money off
players for years by having them be gladiators, going toe to toe.  If they get the
reward, they have to assume the risk.” Id.
101. For a more detailed discussion of cumulative injury awareness and pend-
ing litigation in California, see supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Matthews II, 688 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2012) (providing example of
highly factual analysis).
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B. Conflicting Federal and State Policies Toward Deference to
Alternative Dispute Resolution
The statutory and contractual barriers faced by athletes seek-
ing to recover workers’ compensation for cumulative injury provide
context for how courts assess player claims.103  In addition to this
prohibitive framework, there is a general federal labor policy of def-
erence towards mechanisms of alternative dispute resolution.104
Players seeking to overcome these substantial obstacles have limited
options.105  They must either succeed in claiming that the decision
of the arbitrator contravened state policy in preventing an em-
ployee from inadvertently waiving their eligibility to workers’ com-
pensation benefits, or demonstrate that the enforcement of an
arbitration award would constitute a manifest disregard of the
law.106  In order to comprehend the ability of Matthews to function
as a beneficial case for players, an understanding of these compet-
ing policies is required.107
Federal labor policy encourages the resolution of labor dis-
putes through arbitration.108  This policy is deeply grounded in ju-
dicial economy and resources; arbitration was designed to provide
more affordable access to litigants who would otherwise burden ju-
dicial capacity.109  Scrutiny of an arbitration decision by the judicial
103. See Schaffer supra note 73, at 635 (detailing contractual mechanism R
through which players are denied access to workers’ compensation).
104. See Aramark Facility Servs. v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1877, 530
F.3d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 2008) (favoring alternative dispute resolution in labor dis-
pute contexts).  “The scope of review of an arbitrator’s decision in a labor dispute
is extremely narrow.”  United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, Local 588
v. Foster Poultry Farms, 74 F.3d 169, 173 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Federated Dept.
Stores v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1442, 901 F.2d 1494,
1496 (9th Cir. 1990)).
105. See Stephen Cormac Carlin & Christopher M. Fairman, supra note 74, at R
104-15 (explaining that statues and contracts are so restrictive, employees are ex-
tremely limited in remedial options).
106. See Aramark, 530 F.3d at 822 (examining narrow exception).
107. For a discussion of the beneficial nature of the Matthews opinion on fu-
ture workers’ compensation cases, see infra notes 222-236 and accompanying text. R
108. See Aramark, 530 F.3d at 822 (favoring alternative dispute resolution in
labor dispute contexts).  “ ‘In [the Ninth Circuit], because federal labor policy
strongly favors the resolution of labor disputes through arbitration, “[j]udicial
scrutiny of an arbitrator’s decision is extremely limited.”’” United Food & Commercial
Workers, 74 F.3d at 173 (emphasis in original) (quoting Stead Motors of Walnut
Creek v. Automotive Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200, 1208 n.8 (9th Cir.
1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 946 (1990)).
109. See Thomas A. Manakides, Note, Arbitration of “Public Injunctions”: Clash
Between State Statutory Remedies and the Federal Arbitration Act, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 433,
435 (2003) (noting reasons why arbitration has traditionally been preferred over
adjudication as means of resolving dispute).
16
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system is limited.110  Accordingly, decisions in arbitration are gener-
ally upheld as long as they represent a reasonable interpretation of
the contract in dispute.111  One exception to this judicial trend
arises when the enforcement of an arbitration award would be con-
trary to public policy.112  In order to vacate an award on such
grounds, the court must find that “an explicit, well defined and
dominant public policy exists and that the policy is one that specifi-
cally militates against the relief ordered by the arbitrator.”113  In
Matthews, a state inclination towards negating any contractual provi-
sion that attempted to waive workers’ compensation benefits
clashed with federal labor policy favoring alternative means of dis-
pute resolution.114
California’s protective labor policy is grounded in Section 5000
of its Labor Code and in the prominent case Alaska Packers’ Associa-
tion v. Industrial Accident Commission.115  California’s Labor Code
states in part, “No contract, rule, or regulation shall exempt the
employer from liability for the compensation fixed by this divi-
sion”116  In Alaska Packers, an employee with a choice of law clause
in his employment agreement applied for workers’ compensation
in California.117  The California Supreme Court examined the em-
ployment relationship, and it found that sufficient contacts existed
to render the employee subject to receive California workers’ com-
pensation benefits.118  Only after that finding did the court apply
California’s Labor Code, concluding that the choice of law clause
110. See, e.g., Aramark, 530 F.3d at 823 (stating that judicial review of arbitra-
tion awards is limited).
111. See id. (“Arbitration awards are ordinarily upheld so long as they re-
present a plausible interpretation of the contract.”).
112. See id. (examining narrow exception).
113. United Food & Commercial Workers, 74 F.3d at 174 (explaining grounds for
vacating award).
114. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting clash be-
tween federal labor policy and state contractual policy).
115. See Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 34 P.2d 716, 719-20
(Cal. 1934) [hereinafter Alaska Packers I] (highlighting sources of California’s pro-
tective labor policy).
116. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 5000 (West 2013) (“No contract, rule, or regulation
shall exempt the employer from liability for the compensation fixed by [the work-
ers’ compensation statute].”); see also id. LAB. § 2804 (“Any contract or agreement,
express or implied, made by any employee to waive the benefits of this article or
any part thereof, is null and void . . . .”).
117. See Alaska Packers I, 34 P.2d at 717-21 (providing factual basis for
challenge).
118. See id. at 720-21 (holding employee could receive benefits, despite bind-
ing arbitration clause, because employee could otherwise receive the benefits).
17
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in the employee agreement was unenforceable.119  Thus, the court
used a two-step process in determining whether the employee could
receive California benefits.120  First, the court examined sufficient
contacts.121  Second, the court scrutinized the claim under the Cali-
fornia Labor Code.122  The employee was not able to invoke the
protections of the California Labor Code until he had first met the
sufficient contacts test.123  The sufficient contacts test derived from
the California Supreme Court decision in Pacific Employers.124 Pa-
cific Employers stated that California workers’ compensation applies
to an employee who was injured and suffered medical expenses in
that state.125  At a minimum, the court noted that coverage would
extend to an employee whose injury cost had some impact on Cali-
fornia’s medical system.126
In addition to federal and state public policy exceptions to
general deference to arbitration in labor contexts, an employee can
argue another exception.127  This narrow exception applies when
119. See id. (noting that California Labor Code was not applied until court
determined that employee would likely be eligible to receive workers’
compensation).
120. For a discussion on how this reasoning is flawed, see supra notes 192-221 R
and accompanying text.
121. See Alaska Packers I, 34 P.2d at 718-21 (examining contacts as preliminary
matter).
122. See id. (applying California Labor Code to claim); CAL. LAB. CODE § 2804
(West 2013) (stating that contracts waiving employee benefits are “null and void”
in California); CAL. LAB. CODE § 5000 (West 2013) (“No contract, rule, or regula-
tion shall exempt the employer from liability for the compensation fixed by [the
workers’ compensation statute].”).
123. See generally Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 75 P.2d
1058 (Cal. 1938) (explaining that sufficient contacts exist where employee suffers
discrete injury in California).
124. See id. at 1062-63 (promulgating California’s sufficient contacts test for
workers’ compensation claims that might otherwise be barred from jurisdiction
under restrictive contractual claims).
125. See Alaska Packers I, 34 P.2d at 718-21 (asserting that contacts will only
exist where costs associated with employee’s injury may impact California’s medical
system and other resources).
126. See id. (hypothesizing that some impact on state medial sources would be
prerequisite).
127. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d 1107, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Like the public
policy exception, manifest disregard of the law is a narrow exception to the gen-
eral principle of deference to arbitration awards.  It is ‘shorthand for a statutory
ground under the [Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)], . . . which states that the court
may vacate “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.”’”); Comedy Club, Inc. v.
Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kyocera Corp. v.
Prudential–Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)).
Although the Titans and NFLMC were unable to decide whether the FAA applies
to arbitration of collective bargaining agreements, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Matthews assumed that they did. Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1115 n.7 (“The
Titans and NFLMC point out that we have not decided whether the FAA applies to
18
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enforcement of an arbitration award would be a manifest disregard
of the law.128  Vested in both the Federal Arbitration Act and in
Ninth Circuit case law, this exception allows employees to evade
enforcement of arbitration awards where arbitrators “exceed their
powers” by recognizing applicable law and subsequently disregard-
ing it.129  Employees seeking relief under this exception often cite
to a manifest disregard of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution.130  The Full Faith and Credit Clause
states that, “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each state to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State.”131  In the context of workers compensation cases in Califor-
nia, an employee could argue that California has a constitutionally
guaranteed right to apply its workers compensation laws to claims
brought within the state.132  As a corollary to this principle, an em-
ployee could argue that California has an absolute right to prohibit
any contractual waiver of those rights.133  By imposing another
arbitration of collective bargaining agreements. . . .  For purposes of our discussion
here, we will assume that it would.”).
128. See Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 826, 832 (9th
Cir.1995) (defining “manifest disregard of the law” exception, stating, “for an arbi-
trator’s award to be in manifest disregard of the law, it must be clear from the
record that the arbitrator recognized the applicable law and then ignored it”).
129. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(4) (2013) (validating
manifest disregard of law exception as vacatur of arbitration award).  “[T]he
United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make
an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitra-
tion . . . where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.” Id.
130. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1 (mandating respect for each sovereign
state’s laws and promulgations).  “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” Id.
131. Id. (providing Constitutional language on which exception to arbitration
enforcement is based).
132. See Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of California, 294
U.S. 532, 547 (1935) [hereinafter Alaska Packers II] (“A rigid and literal enforce-
ment of the full faith and credit clause, without regard to the statute of the forum,
would lead to the absurd result that, wherever the conflict arises, the statute of
each state must be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own.”);
Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 306 U.S. 493, 503 (1939)
(holding that Full Faith and Credit Clause did not prevent California from apply-
ing its workers’ compensation statute even though it conflicted with laws of
Massachusetts).
133. See, e.g., Matthews II, 688 F.3d 1107, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (arguing that
Alaska Packers and Pacific Employers established that “California has the absolute
right to apply its workers’ compensation laws within its borders and to prohibit any
employee from waiving those rights.”).
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state’s laws to a California workers’ compensation controversy, an
arbitrator could thus violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause.134
In Alaska Packers and Pacific Employers, the United States Su-
preme Court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not
prevent California from applying its workers’ compensation statute
even though it conflicted with the laws of Alaska and Massachusetts,
respectively.135  In both cases, the Supreme Court emphasized Cali-
fornia’s strong interest in the respective controversies.136  In Alaska
Packers, the United States Supreme Court found the interest of Cali-
fornia in regulating the labor sector, and more specifically in regu-
lating employee injuries that may result in a burden on state
resources, sufficient to justify application of California law.137  Simi-
larly, in Pacific Employers, the Court determined that “[f]ew matters
could be deemed more appropriately the concern of [a] state” than
the safety, health and economic protection of employees injured
within that state’s boundaries.138  These cases, however, do not hold
that California has an absolute right to apply its law.139  Rather, the
134. See id. (emphasizing California’s ability to apply its workers’ compensa-
tion laws within its borders).  Matthews argued that by imposing the law of Tennes-
see upon the tribunals of the State of California, the arbitrator violated the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, and thus manifestly disregarded the law. Id.
135. See id. (noting however that “[t]he Supreme Court did not hold that Cali-
fornia had an ‘absolute right’ to apply its law, irrespective of the extent of its con-
tacts with the employee or employment relationship in question.”); see also Pac.
Emp’rs v. Indstl. Accident Comm., 306 U.S. 493, 504-05 (1939) (holding that Full
Faith and Credit Clause did not prevent California from applying its workers’ com-
pensation statute even though it conflicted with laws of Massachusetts); Alaska
Packers II, 294 U.S. 532, 533 (1935) (holding Full Faith and Credit Clause did not
prevent California from applying its workers’ compensation statute even though it
conflicted with laws of Alaska).
136. See Alaska Packers II, 294 U.S. at 550 (“No persuasive reason is shown for
denying to California the right to enforce its own laws in its own courts, and in the
circumstances the full faith and credit clause does not require that the statutes of
Alaska be given that effect.”); Pac. Emp’rs, 306 U.S. at 503 (emphasizing employee’s
contacts and highlighting discrete and specific injuries within California).  “Al-
though Massachusetts has an interest in safeguarding the compensation of Massa-
chusetts employees while temporarily abroad in the course of their employment,
and may adopt that policy for itself, that could hardly be thought to support an
application of the full faith and credit clause which would override the constitu-
tional authority of another state to legislate for the bodily safety and economic
protection of employees injured within it.  Few matters could be deemed more
appropriately the concern of the state in which the injury occurs or more com-
pletely within its power.” Id.
137. See, e.g., Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1116 (establishing burden on state re-
sources as basis for justifying public policy exception).
138. See Pac. Emp’rs, 306 U.S. at 503 (listing primary concerns of the state); see
also Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413 (1955) (recognizing Arkansas’ interest in
providing remedy to employees injured in Arkansas).
139. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1116 (emphasizing that these cases do not
establish “absolute right,” as asserted by Matthews).
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cases emphasize the factual analysis necessary to establish sufficient
contacts to then justify the application of California law.140
IV. MATTHEWS V. NFL: NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined
that California did not have the right to apply its law in Matthews
because Bruce Matthews failed to establish sufficient contacts with
California.141  The court divided its discussion into three sections:
California Public Policy; Federal Labor Policy; and a discussion of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause.142  It determined that the arbitra-
tor’s decision was not a violation of either state or federal public
policy.143  The court also denied relief to Matthews under his Full
Faith and Credit Claim.144  These decisions ultimately resulted in a
loss for Matthews.145  The decision of the arbitrator was pro-
nounced binding and Matthews’ application for worker’s compen-
sation would never be reviewed.146
A. California Public Policy
Matthews proposed that California embraced an explicit public
policy negating contractual agreements that purport to waive an
employee’s right to later seek workers’ compensation benefits.147
He further noted that the decisions of these Californian tribunals
were not swayed by the tenuous nature of the connection between
140. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981) (plurality opinion)) (stat-
ing, “ ‘[F]or a State’s substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible
manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair.’”). Id.
141. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1117 (holding that none of exceptions of-
fered by Matthews can justify setting aside Tennessee law prescribed in employ-
ment agreement).
142. See id. at 1111-17 (discussing and discarding each of Matthews’ conten-
tions and ultimately deciding for NFL).
143. See id. at 1111-15 (examining state and federal policy arguments asserted
by Matthews).
144. See id. at 1111-17 (denying relief for both claims).
145. See id. at 1115-17 (addressing and invalidating Matthews’ Full Faith and
Credit Claim).
146. See id. at 1117 (affirming arbitrator’s award).
147. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1111 (“Matthews contends that California has
an explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy militating against agreements
that purport to waive an employee’s right to seek California workers’ compensa-
tion benefits before a California tribunal, no matter how tenuous the connection
between California and the employee or the employment.  Matthews derives this
‘no waiver’ policy primarily from the California workers’ compensation
statute . . . .”).
21
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California and the state employee.148  To support this position, Mat-
thews relied on California Labor Code Section 5000 and the deci-
sion in Alaska Packers’ Association v. Industrial Accident Commission.149
The Ninth Circuit did not accept these interpretations of California
law, explaining that the retired football player’s construction of Cal-
ifornia policy was too broad.150
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that Matthews’
construction of California policy seemed to grant a universal right
to seek workers’ compensation benefits under the state’s regime.151
Rather, as the court described, California policy only seeks to pro-
tect an employee who is otherwise eligible to receive benefits under
the state’s workers’ compensation regime from contractually waiv-
ing those benefits.152  The court stated that this California policy,
known as the “no waiver rule,” only protected an employee when
that employee’s compensation claim was subject to California
law.153
The Court determined that Matthews was not subject to Cali-
fornia law.154  An individual seeking eligibility under California’s
workers’ compensation regime bears the burden of showing that
the contested arbitration award violates public policy.155  The court
noted that in order to forgo the common, highly deferential review
148. See id. at 1112 (contending that strong language contained in Califor-
nia’s Code should be interpreted as to override sufficient contacts hypothesizing
by court).
149. See id. at 1111 (“Matthews contends that by prohibiting him from seeking
benefits under California law, the arbitration award violates this fundamental pol-
icy.”); see also Alaska Packers I, 34 P.2d 716, 721 (Cal. 1934) (relying on combination
of case law and statute to demonstrate that hypothetical problems with sufficient
contacts should not act to bar applicant from applying); CAL. LAB. CODE § 5000
(West 2013) (“No contract, rule, or regulation shall exempt the employer from
liability for the compensation fixed by [the workers’ compensation statute].”); see
also id. LAB. § 2804 (“Any contract or agreement, express or implied, made by any
employee to waive the benefits of this article or any part thereof, is null and
void . . . .”).
150. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1113 (deciding against Matthews for this par-
ticular claim).
151. See id. at 1111 (stating Ninth Circuit’s problem with Matthews’ interpre-
tation of California policy).
152. See id. at 1111-12 (explaining correct interpretation of California policy).
The court further noted that the policy was in place to dually protect the worker
from receiving benefits and to ensure employer liability. See id. at 1112.  California
policy ensures that employers cannot contractually absolve themselves of liability
for work-related injury. See id.
153. See id at 1113 (explaining no-waiver rule).
154. See id. at 1114 (“On the record before us, however, Matthews has not
shown that his claim falls within the scope of the Pacific Employers rule.”).
155. See id. at 1112 (stating that burden rests with individual seeking workers’
compensation).
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given to an arbitration award, the court must find that California
workers’ compensation law applies to Matthews in the first place.156
Under the rule in Pacific Employers, if Matthews had suffered an in-
jury and was treated for that injury in California, he would be sub-
ject to the protections of that state’s workers’ compensation
regime.157  Having established that Matthews would have been sub-
ject to the state’s benefits, the court would then be able to apply the
California Labor Code to render the choice of law and binding ar-
bitration provisions unenforceable.158
Unfortunately, Matthews could not proffer any evidence of any
particular injury sustained in California.159  In his application for
benefits, the retired player stated that he suffered cumulative inju-
ries incurred at a variety of locations between 1983 and 2001.160  He
was unable to allege any specific injury in California.161  Further-
more, he was unable to allege specific medical treatment or services
rendered in California over that time period.162  In fact, Matthews
did not even allege that he ever played football in California.163
156. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1112 (“Because of our highly limited and
deferential standard of review of arbitration awards, it must be clear that Matthews
is within the category of injured employees to which California workers’ compensa-
tion law extends.”).
157. See Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 306 U.S. 493,
503 (1939); see also Alaska Packers I, 34 P.2d 716, 719-21 (Cal. 1934) (showing
discrete or specific injury would absolutely pass sufficient contacts test).
158. See Alaska Packers I, 34 P.2d at 721 (providing example of case using this
formula where employee was found eligible for workers’ compensation benefits).
159. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1113 (explaining that court graciously in-
ferred that he had played in California from Matthews’ participation on NFL
team).  “In his application for workers’ compensation benefits, Matthews asserted
that he suffered cumulative injuries incurred at ‘various’ locations between 1983
and 2001.  He did not allege any specific injury in California or a need for medical
services in California.” Id.  “Matthews likewise did not allege in his complaint
before the district court that he suffered any discrete injury in California.  Nor has
he directed us to anything in the record indicating that he tried to prove injury in
California, or any burden on the state’s resources.” Id.
160. See id. (suggesting that arguing cumulative injury could be legitimate way
to circumvent fact that Matthews never suffered any particular injury in
California).
161. For a reference to the fact that Matthews was never benched for injury,
see supra note 9. R
162. See id. (noting that Matthews failed to state that he ever even played foot-
ball in California on his application but judges were willing to allow clemency on
this matter, accepting as obvious fact that he had played in California).
163. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1113 (offering proof that Matthews did not
allege any injury in California). But see Heitner, supra note 78 (discussing emerg- R
ing recognition of cumulative injury) and Rovell, supra note 82 (stating, “[t]he R
most exposure to teams lies in the state where the most teams play: California.”).
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B. Federal Labor Policy
Matthews’ federal labor policy argument mirrored his state
public policy argument.164  He argued that federal labor policy pro-
vides that an employee may not bargain away state minimum labor
standards through a collective bargaining agreement.165  By inter-
preting the NFL collective bargaining agreement and his employ-
ment contract as a waiver of his right to state workers’
compensation benefits, Matthews proposed that the arbitration
award conflicted with this federal labor policy.166  In accord with its
response to his state policy argument, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals focused on the ambiguity of Matthews’ eligibility under
California’s workers’ compensation regime.167  The NFL’s griev-
ance was filed before Matthews’ application could be reviewed.168
Consequently, Matthews could not demonstrate with certainty that
he would have been deemed eligible for the benefits.169  The arbi-
tration award could not violate federal policy, the court deter-
mined, because Matthews could not demonstrate that the
164. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1114-15 (following similar reasoning as state
policy claim).  Whereas California state policy operates generally against agree-
ments that purport to waive an employee’s right to seek California workers’ com-
pensation benefits before a California tribunal, Federal Labor Policy focuses on
Collective Bargaining Agreements (“CBAs”). See id. (“[Federal Labor Policy] pro-
vides that an employee may not, through a collective bargaining agreement, bar-
gain away state minimum labor standards.”).
165. See id. at 1115. (focusing on CBAs); see also Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S.
107, 123–24 (1994) (“[LMRA Section] 301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt
nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law.”);
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 755–56 (1985) (finding that
National Labor Relations Act does not permit “unions and employers to bargain
for terms of employment that state law forbids employers to establish unilater-
ally”); Contract Servs. Network, Inc. v. Aubry, 62 F.3d 294, 298–99 (9th Cir. 1995)
(finding that California’s workers’ compensation statute “cannot be undercut by
collective bargaining”).
166. See Matthews II, at 1115 (applying this rule to facts in Matthews to generate
argument that violation of Federal Labor Policy occurred).
167. See id. (stating, “[I]t is not clear that Matthews’ workers’ compensation
claim falls within the scope of California’s workers’ compensation regime.  He has
therefore not shown that an arbitration award preventing him from seeking Cali-
fornia benefits deprives him of something to which he is entitled under state
law.”).
168. See id. at 1110 (setting forth procedural history of case).
169. See id. at 1116 (“California’s interest is highly attenuated in this case.  On
the facts alleged it is not even clear that the courts of California would consider
California’s interest sufficient to justify the application of California law to Mat-
thews’ workers’ compensation claim.”).  For a discussion of the flaws in the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning, see infra notes 192-221 and accompanying text.
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arbitrator’s award deprived him of something to which he was enti-
tled under state law.170
C. Full Faith and Credit
Matthews’ final contention focused on the “manifest disregard
of the law” exception to the general principle of deference to arbi-
tration determinations.171  “[F]or an arbitrator’s award to be in
manifest disregard of the law, it must be clear from the record that
the arbitrator recognized the applicable law and then ignored
it.”172  Specifically, Matthews argued that the arbitrator’s award was
a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitu-
tion.173  The Full Faith and Credit Clause states that, “Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial proceedings of every other State.”174
In Alaska Packers and Pacific Employers, the United States Su-
preme Court determined that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did
not preclude California from implementing its workers’ compensa-
tion statute, despite the fact it conflicted with the laws of both Mas-
sachusetts and Alaska.175  Matthews claimed that these two
decisions established that California has the right to apply its work-
ers’ compensation laws within its borders and to prohibit any em-
170. See Matthews II, at 1115  (reasoning that Matthews needed to demonstrate
eligibility for workers’ compensation in California).
We hold that Matthews has not alleged sufficient contacts with California
to show that his workers’ compensation claim comes within the scope of
California’s workers’ compensation regime.  He has therefore not met his
burden of establishing that the arbitration award prohibiting him from
pursuing California benefits violates an explicit, well-defined and domi-
nant public policy of the state of California.  Because Matthews has not
shown that the award deprives him of something to which he is entitled
under state law, he likewise has not shown that it violates federal labor
policy.
Id. at 1110.
171. Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1110 (“Matthews also argues that the award is in
manifest disregard of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Consti-
tution.”).  For a discussion of the “manifest disregard for the law” exception, see
supra notes 127-134 and accompanying text. R
172. Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1115 (quoting Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv. W.
Assocs., 553 F.2d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009)).
173. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1 (requiring acknowledgement of each sover-
eign state’s laws and promulgations).
174. Id. (providing language of Full Faith and Credit Clause).
175. See Pac. Emp’rs v. Indstl. Accident Comm., 306 U.S. 493, 504-05 (1939)
(holding that Full Faith and Credit Clause did not prevent California from apply-
ing its workers’ compensation statute even though it conflicted with laws of Massa-
chusetts); Alaska Packers II, 294 U.S. 532, 533 (1935) (holding Full Faith and Credit
Clause did not prevent California from applying its workers’ compensation statute
even though it conflicted with laws of Alaska).
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ployee from waiving those rights.176  Matthews asserted that the
arbitrator ignored the principle set forth in Alaska Packers and Pa-
cific Employers by imposing the law of Tennessee to his claim.177  By
impermissibly applying this Tennessee law, Matthews argued that
the arbitrator disregarded Supreme Court precedent.178  The arbi-
trator’s award, he contended, should be set aside under the “mani-
fest disregard of the law” exception.179
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed.180  The court
distinguished Alaska Packers’ and Pacific Employers by highlighting
the extent of contacts between California and the respective em-
ployees in those cases.181  The court explained that California did
not have an “absolute right” to apply its law.182  In Alaska Packers,
the Court highlighted California’s interest in regulating employ-
ment relationships entered into within the state, particularly when
injury to the employee might result in a burden on the state’s re-
sources.183  Likewise, in Pacific Employers, the Court considered Cali-
fornia’s right to apply its laws to a Massachusetts resident injured
while working in California and concluded that, “[f]ew matters
could be deemed more appropriately the concern of [a] state” than
“legislat[ing] for the bodily safety and economic protection of em-
ployees injured within it.”184  Rather, this right was contingent on
the state’s substantial interest in the controversy before it and on
176. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1115 (contending that by imposing law of
Tennessee upon tribunals of State of California, arbitrator violated Full Faith and
Credit Clause, and  manifestly disregarded law).
177. See id. (arguing application of Tennessee law was erroneous); see also Pac.
Emp’rs, 306 U.S. 493 at 509 (siding with employee under manifest disregard of the
law exception).
178. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1115 (noting Matthews’ argument that arbi-
trator disregarded binding authority).
179. See id. (applying Alaska Packers and Pac. Emp’rs to his claim).
180. See id. at 1117 (declining to accept Matthews’ argument and holding for
NFL).
181. See Pac. Emp’rs, 306 U.S. at 503 (1939) (holding that Full Faith and Credit
Clause did not prevent California from applying its workers’ compensation statute
even though it conflicted with laws Massachusetts); Alaska Packers II, 294 U.S. 532,
547 (1935) (“A rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit clause,
without regard to the statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd result that,
wherever the conflict arises, the statute of each state must be enforced in the
courts of the other, but cannot be in its own.”).
182. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1115 (“The Supreme Court did not hold that
California had an ‘absolute right’ to apply its law, irrespective of the extent of its
contacts with the employee or employment relationship in question.”).
183. See Alaska Packers I, 34 P.2d 716, 719-21 (Cal. 1934) (determining con-
tacts will only exist where costs associated with employee’s injury may impact Cali-
fornia’s medical system and other resources).
184. Pac. Emp’rs, 306 U.S. 493 at 503 (explaining that sufficient contacts exist
where an employee suffers discrete injury in California).
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the contacts that each employee had with the state.185  The court in
Matthews explained that California did not have an “absolute right”
to apply its law.186  Instead, this right was contingent on California’s
substantial interest in Matthews’ controversy and on the contact
that Matthews had with the state.187
In assessing whether the arbitrator’s decision was a manifest
disregard of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the court noted the
highly attenuated nature of California’s interest in this case.188  On
the facts alleged, the court explained that it remained unclear
whether the courts of California would consider California’s inter-
est sufficient to justify the application of California law to Matthews’
claim.189  “Because Matthews has not shown that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause guarantees California’s right to apply its law on the
facts of this case, he has not established that the arbitrator recognized
yet chose to ignore, well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable
[law].”190  In essence, the court denied Matthews’ “manifest disre-
gard of the law” Full Faith and Credit claim for the same reasons
they denied his claim on California state policy grounds: Califor-
nia’s interest in this case could not be measured to a sufficient de-
gree because Matthews had not proffered specific instances of
injuries or presence in California.191
185. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1116 (illuminating lack of “absolute right” by
stating that right was contingent on state’s interest and on employee’s contacts
with state).
186. See id. (revealing that no substantial interest existed in Matthews, unlike
Pacific Employers or Alaska Packers, where “the Court recognized California’s strong
interest in regulating employment relationships entered into within the state, par-
ticularly when injury to the employee may result in a burden on the state’s
resources.”).
187. For a discussion of the flaws in the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, see infra
notes 192-221 and accompanying text.
188. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1117 (“California’s interest is highly attenu-
ated in this case.”).
189. See id. (highlighting flaws in Matthews’ factual pleading and suggesting
allegations of specific injury and other contacts would benefit future litigants).
190. Id. (emphasis added).
191. See id. at 1117 n.9 (“Matthews asserts in his brief that, like the employee
in Pacific Employers, he suffered injuries while temporarily working in California.
We reiterate that the record is silent on this point.  Even assuming, however, that
games Matthews played in California contributed, cumulatively, to the ailments he
suffers today, it is not clear that California would extend its workers’ compensation
regime to cover him.”).
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V. CIRCLING THE FIELD
In analyzing Matthews’ claim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals engaged in circular reasoning that weakened its legitimacy.192
This approach enabled the court to focus exclusively on hypotheti-
cal eligibility for workers’ compensation, rather than on the under-
lying contractual enforcement issues.193  Faced with competing
labor law policies and a complex socio-legal environment, the court
may have directed audience attention away from contractual issues
in an effort to avoid promulgating precedent in a hotly contested
and quickly developing area of law.194  The court’s circular reason-
ing and its resulting narrow focus on eligibility are problematic be-
cause they weaken the justification used by the court to ultimately
substantiate its holding.195  The method of analysis could prove
beneficial, however, to future litigants in the Ninth Circuit who will
now be able to draft their pleadings according to the specific
roadmap provided in Matthews.196
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by stating that Matthews
did not allege any specific or discrete injury in California.197  Conse-
192. See id. at 1115 (“As we explained above, it is not clear that Matthews’
workers’ compensation claim falls within the scope of California’s workers’ com-
pensation regime.  He has therefore not shown that an arbitration award prevent-
ing him from seeking California benefits deprives him of something to which he is
entitled under state law.”).
193. See generally Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1112-1117 (discussing and dismissing
each of Matthews’ claims based on his hypothetical ineligibility).
194. See Schwarz, supra note 81 (offering information about how California is R
dealing with complex issue of cumulative injury and flood of such claims in their
courts).  In 1997, the NFL tried unsuccessfully to lobby the California legislature to
exclude professional athletes from workers’ compensation benefits. Id. The Cin-
cinnati Bengals have incorporated language in their contracts requiring players to
file claims only in Ohio (one state where cumulative trauma is not compensable)
and are currently fending off more than 30 claims. Id. Other teams have reluc-
tantly resigned themselves to expensive cost of conducting business in California.
Id.  “Teams’ insurance policies have varied widely over the years, but most provide
for a $250,000 deductible per claim, according to several lawyers familiar with the
system; that translates to about $175 million in total potential liability just for the
700 players currently pursuing claims, or about $5.5 million per team.  Most of that
is for players who would be ineligible to file in any other state but California.” Id.
195. See Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 8
(2001) (stating that circular reasoning is inherently suspect).
196. See Benjamin Haynes, Bruce Matthews Denied, but Provides Hope for Future
Workers Compensation Claims, SPORT IN LAW (Aug. 8, 2012), http://sportinlaw.com/
2012/08/08/bruce-matthews-denied-but-provides-hope-for-future-workers-com-
pensation-claims/ (analyzing this case as providing hope to future players). But see
NFL Owners Win Important Victory, supra note 87 (describing case as victory for R
NFL).
197. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1111 (“Rather than guarantee a universal
right to seek California workers’ compensation benefits, the workers’ compensa-
tion statute establishes a rule that an employee who is otherwise eligible for Cali-
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quently, the court explained, it was not clear that he fell within the
category of employees to whom workers’ compensation extends.198
The court’s two-step test to determine eligibility for workers’ com-
pensation states that if a player can prove that they would be able to
receive California workers’ compensation benefits, then the court
will render the choice of law and binding arbitration clauses in
their contracts unenforceable.199  Thus, the court’s logic is rather
circular because it essentially holds that if the player can receive
benefits, the court will allow them to receive benefits.200  The analy-
sis focuses entirely on eligibility, not on contract enforceability.201
By focusing on benefit eligibility, rather than on contract en-
forceability, the court circumvents the underlying contractual issue
of unequal bargaining power.202  Originally designed to provide
employees a more accessible and affordable route to justice, arbitra-
tion is quickly gaining a reputation for providing employers with a
cheap route to injustice.203  One may construe the court’s avoid-
fornia benefits cannot be deemed to have contractually waived those benefits, and
an employer who is otherwise liable for California benefits cannot evade liability
through contract.”).
198. See id. at 1112 (“Because of our highly limited and deferential standard
of review of arbitration awards, it must be clear that Matthews is within the category
of injured employees to which California workers’ compensation law extends.”).
199. See id. at 1117 (citing Alaska Packers I, 34 P.2d 716, 716 (Cal. 1934))
(“The California Supreme Court concluded that the choice of law clause was unen-
forceable under the statutory predecessor to § 5000, but only after finding that the
employment relationship in question had sufficient contacts with California to ap-
ply California’s workers’ compensation law.”).
200. See id. at 1115 (“As we explained above, it is not clear that Matthews’
workers’ compensation claim falls within the scope of California’s workers’ com-
pensation regime.  He has therefore not shown that an arbitration award prevent-
ing him from seeking California benefits deprives him of something to which he is
entitled under state law.”).
201. See id. (disregarding analysis of contractual issues and focusing on eligi-
bility for workers’ compensation).
202. See generally, Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1112-1117 (avoiding discussion of
collective bargaining agreement, choice of law provision, and equitable ramifica-
tions of enforcing them).
203. See Roquemore, supra note 75, at 802 (noting arbitration as one mecha- R
nism for restricting player access to workers’ compensation).
As workers’ compensation claims from players not in uniform since the
1980s and beyond started trickling into team offices, the initial response
was to grin and bear it.  Once the trickle became an avalanche, teams
began to fight back to try to avoid the ‘extreme cost.’  Now professional
sports leagues, namely the NFL, are taking several angles—litigation, leg-
islation, and even arbitration—to combat what they perceive to be a prob-
lem.  Meanwhile, professional athletes, namely current and former
employees of NFL teams, are taking up arms to defend their workers’
compensation rights by blocking methods of litigation, legislation, and
arbitration aimed at them.
Id.
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ance of arbitration issues in this case as an expression of dissatisfac-
tion with the current deferential state of arbitration law in the
United States.204  As this area becomes more contested and grows
more complex with the NFL cumulative injury litigation, courts may
continue to circumvent these intricacies by focusing on other issues
within cases.205
The Ninth Circuit supported its decision based on hypothetical
contingencies, rather than on substantive facts offered in Matthews’
brief.206  The issue before the court was whether the award, which
prohibited Matthews from seeking workers’ compensation benefits
under the laws of California, violated California public policy.207
Rather than address this issue directly, the court’s rationale dis-
tracted from the pertinent issue and was grounded in circular rea-
soning.208  The court prevented Matthews from applying for
workers’ compensation benefits in California simply because the
workers’ compensation tribunal may deny Matthews’ application.209
The essence of a workers’ compensation application system is the
application.210  Intrinsic in the operative word, “apply” is the notion
that some applicants will be denied and others will succeed.211  Still,
204. See generally Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1115 (demonstrating how court is
avoiding issue by engaging in circular reasoning.)  One possible reason the court is
avoiding these issues is that it disagrees with the current state of arbitration law.
See generally id.  For a discussion on the court’s circular reasoning, see supra notes
200-201 and accompanying text. R
205. See generally, Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1112-17 (noting that what began as
“trickle” is now full-blown “avalanche” of claims); see also Concussion Conundrum:
Panels 2 & 3, supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing NFL “Concussion
Conundrum”); NFL CONCUSSION LITIGATION, supra note 70 and accompany text R
(discussing NFL concussion litigation).
206. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1112 (relying on combination of case law and
California Labor Code § 5000 to demonstrate that hypothetical problems with suf-
ficient contacts should not bar applicant from applying).
207. See id. at 1111 (introducing basic facts and summarizing central issue in
case).
208. See id. at 1115 (requiring clear answer on his application but prohibiting
him from filing it).  “As we explained above, it is not clear that Matthews’ workers’
compensation claim falls within the scope of California’s workers’ compensation
regime.  He has therefore not shown that an arbitration award preventing him
from seeking California benefits deprives him of something to which he is entitled
under state law.” Id.
209. See id. (providing case analysis).
210. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1996), application (defining appli-
cation as “[t]he act of making a request for something”).
211. See generally id. (implying that judgment must be made on application, or
request). See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1996), judgment (quoting 1 HENRY
CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 1, at 2 (2d ed. 1902))
(“But as no right can exist without a correlative duty, nor any invasion of it without
a corresponding obligation to make amends, the judgment necessarily affirms, or
else denies, that such a duty or such a liability rests upon the person against whom
30
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the court denied Matthews the right to apply for benefits simply
because Matthews may not succeed in his application.212  In justify-
ing its holding, the Ninth Circuit made logical missteps.213  These
missteps weaken the utility and acceptability of Matthews as
precedent.214
Matthews did not fail because the choice of law provision in his
contract stated that the matter was to be decided according to Ten-
nessee law.215  He failed because he did not claim a specific injury
that arose from his time in California.216  If he could have demon-
strated a specific injury, he could have established sufficient con-
tacts.217  If he had established specific contacts under Alaska Packers
and Pacific Employment, the California public policy would have been
triggered, and his claim would have succeeded.218  Alternatively,
Matthews’ argument under the Full Faith and Credit clause would
also have succeeded if he could have established sufficient con-
tacts.219  If a former NFL player can show that he suffered a distinct
and specific injury in California, Matthews v. NFL makes it clear that
the player will be able to override the choice of law provision in his
employment contract and invalidate the arbitrator’s decision.220  Al-
though the court did not discuss contract enforceability, the eligi-
bility analysis in Matthews v. NFL has vast implications for this
area.221
the aid of the law is invoked.”).  Judgments involve decisions that imply two alter-
native possible outcomes. See id.
212. For a discussion of why the court Matthews’ application to be uncertain
and therefore denying Matthews permission to apply to workers’ compensation,
see supra note 127 and accompanying text. R
213. For an explanation of how the Matthews court uses circular reasoning,
see supra note 208 and accompanying text. R
214. See Abramowicz, supra note 195 (identifying problems associated with R
legitimacy and circular reasoning).
215. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d 1107, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that Mat-
thews lacked sufficient contacts and thus failed in his claim).
216. See id. (emphasizing main deficiency with Matthews’ allegations).
217. See Haynes, supra note 196 (hypothesizing what court would have needed R
to grant Matthews’ claim).
218. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1116 (distinguishing Matthews’ claim from
those in Alaska Packers and Pacific Employers on these grounds); see also Haynes,
supra note 196 (predicting that Matthews would have succeeded if there had been R
stronger evidence of California public policy).
219. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1116-17 (highlighting lack of “absolute right”
by stating that right was contingent on state’s interest and on employee’s contacts
with state).
220. See id. (listing shortcomings of Matthews’ application, thus listing what
future claimants would need to include in application to enrich their claim).
221. See Schwarz, supra note 81 (providing New York Times’ analysis of ways R
that cumulative litigation cases can change not only area of law, but also actual
game of football).
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VI. MATTHEWS V. NFL: A GAME-CHANGER
The implications for the Matthews opinion are, in a word, ti-
tanic.222  The case has the potential to impact not only how football
lawsuits are litigated in a courtroom, but also how the very game
itself is played in stadiums across the country.223  For example, one
sports insurance expert has noted, “More than anything else. . . the
workers’ compensation reality could be the one item that forces sig-
nificant changes to how the game is played on the field.”224  Rules
may be changed to protect players from injury and to protect teams
from liability.225  For example, linemen “might not be allowed to
crash into each other from three-point stances in the near
future.”226
A small addition to Matthews’ lifetime of Herculean acts, Mat-
thews v. NFL will provide a roadmap to his fellow retired players.227
His litigation has highlighted that players must be comprehensive
in their applications for workers’ compensation.228  The court in
Matthews noted that he failed to provide any injuries, medical ser-
vices, or treatment ever incurred in California.229  In doing so, the
court hints that if Matthews had been able to offer some evidence
of any of the foregoing, he may have been eligible for the receipt of
benefits under the California workers’ compensation regime.230  In
denying Matthews’ candidacy for workers’ compensation, the court
noted the lack of many factors on Matthews’ application including:
alleged injuries sustained in California; records of medical services
222. See id. (“Given the dozens and perhaps hundreds of players who could
file similar claims, experts in the California system said N.F.L. teams and their
insurers could be facing liability of $100 million or more.  They identified a wide
spectrum of possible effects: these costs could merely represent a financial nui-
sance for a league that recorded $8.5 billion in revenue last year, or, if insurance
costs rise drastically because of such claims, the N.F.L. could be forced to alter its
rules to reduce head trauma.  Officials already are considering decreased contact
in practice and forbidding linemen from using the three-point stance.”).
223. See id. (recognizing extensive potential impact for NFL workers’ compen-
sation cases).
224. Rovell, supra note 82 (predicting that if one cultural or economic influ- R
ence has power to change way football is played, its emergence of cumulative in-
jury cases in workers’ compensation).
225. See id. (suggesting that rules of game may change).
226. Id. (quoting Duke Niedringhaus of J.W. Terrill, a St. Louis-based insur-
ance firm that has brokered workers’ compensation insurance for NFL teams).
227. See generally Matthews II, 688 F.3d 1107, 1111-17 (9th Cir. 2012) (sug-
gesting roadmap in Matthews’ will help future claimants).
228. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1116-17 (providing roadmap).
229. See id. at 1114 (noting lack of specific injury assentation).
230. See Haynes, supra note 196 (explaining how Matthews’ personal loss as R
litigant may be considered victory for players in general because of helpful
roadmap it provides).
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received in California; and records of playing football in Califor-
nia.231  By listing the numerous aspects that refuted the merit of
Matthews’ claim, the court essentially provided a checklist or
roadmap to professional football players seeking eligibility for work-
ers’ compensation in California.232
If a former NFL player can show that he suffered a distinct and
concrete injury in California, he may be able to override the choice
of law and the binding arbitration clauses in his contract.233  In de-
nying Matthews’ eligibility, the court might have made it easier for
other athletes in the future to successfully file for worker’s compen-
sation in California.234  Commentators have described this case as
an “NFL Victory.”235  Upon closer inspection, however, it seems the
court has left the “playing field” wide open for future athletes to
benefit from California’s employer-friendly regime.236
Angela Casey Brosnan*
231. See Matthews II, 688 F.3d at 1114-17 (listing deficiencies in Matthews’
claim).
232. See id. (providing list that functions as guide to future claimants).
233. See Haynes, supra note 196 (calling Matthews’ case one of “hope” for R
future players).
234. See id. (describing how roadmap will be used by players).
235. See, e.g., NFL Owners Win Important Victory, supra note 87 (describing case R
as victory for NFL).
236. See Haynes, supra note 196 (predicting other litigants will use Matthews to R
their benefit when applying for workers’ compensation in California).
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